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SURVEY OF RECENT AVIATION DECISIONS
L. S. CARSEY & WILLIAM L. MAYNARD*
I. RECENT DECISIONS
Introduction
D URING 1974 there were a number of significant developments
in aviation law. The scope of this article will be limited to an
overview discussion, highlighting the most significant decisions dur-
ing this period. The decisions discussed are indicative of the evolu-
tionary trend of aviation law: meeting the ever pressing needs of
a modem technological society wherein consumer protection occu-
pies a position of prominence in the hierarchy of the American
judiciary's value system. Although generalizations are usually not
of significant value in an unsettled area of the law, a few general-
izations can be made. The courts continue to (1) construe in-
surance coverage questions against the insurer and in favor of the
insured,1 (2) construe guest statutes unconstitutional,' (3) broaden
* L. S. Carsey is a partner in the Houston, Texas firm of Fulbright & Jaworski.
He has practiced law with that firm since shortly after graduation from Baylor
University Law School in 1952. He is a member of the American Bar Association,
and is chairman designate of the Committee on Aviation and Aerospace Law of
the Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Section of the ABA. He is Secretary-
Treasurer of the Federation of Insurance Counsel and chairman of the Aerospace
Law Committee of the Defense Research Institute. He has been president of the
Texas Association of Defense Counsel and chairman of the Aviation Insurance
Law Committee of the Federation of Insurance Counsel and chairman of the
Tort and Compensation Section of the State Bar of Texas. His law practice has
been substantially devoted to the handling of aviation litigation. Mr. Maynard is
an associate with Fulbright & Jaworski. Mr. Maynard received his B.A. Degree
from the University of Houston in 1970 and received his Doctor of Jurisprudence,
Summa Cum Laude, from the University of Houston in 1973. He is a member
of the American Bar Association, Texas Bar Association and Houston Bar Asso-
ciation.
See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989
(2d Cir. 1974); Braun v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 488 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.
1974); Woods v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 38 Cal. App. 3d 144, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 82 (1974); Southwestern Life Ins. Co. v. Rawsey, 514 S.W.2d 802 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1974, no writ); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Maurer, 505 S.W.2d
931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
ISee Ayer v. Boyle, 37 Cal. App. 3d 822, 112 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1974) (airline
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the overall duty of the air carrier with regard to passenger safety,'
and (4) render decisions which are mutually incompatible, based
primarily upon conflicts of law concepts."
For the sake of comprehension and analysis, the 1974 decisions
are categorized according to subject matter.
Air Carriers
In Saurez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals rendered a decision of significant importance
concerning an air carrier's duty toward a potential passenger who
appears to be in a disabled condition. In Saurez, the facts indicated
that upon Mrs. Saurez' arrival at the airport, she was placed in a
TWA wheelchair, and wheeled to the TWA ticket line. Thereafter,
some difficulties developed with regard to Mrs. Saurez's right to
purchase the airline ticket on an American Express credit card.
Because of complications in verifying the plaintiff's right to use
the American Express credit card, the plaintiff was left unattended
in the airport lobby for some two hours and she ultimately missed
her flight. Since the plaintiff had not purchased a ticket on the
airlines, the trial court refused to give the ordinary jury instruction
concerning a common carrier's duty of care toward a passenger,
holding that the plaintiff was not a passenger. Therefore, the trial
court rendered a judgment on the jury verdict for the defendant.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed the decision of the trial
court, holding specifically that under Illinois law "payment of the
fare is not a prerequisite to acquiring the status of a passenger. ' "
Additionally, the court gave significance to the fact that Mrs.
guest statute); Messmer v. Ker, 96 Idaho 75, 524 P.2d 536 (1974) (airline guest
statute); Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974) (automobile
guest statute).
'Saurez v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 498 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1974). See
Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974); Cronin
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 19 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 313 N.E.2d 245 (1974). But see
Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974).
' Compare Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir.
1974) with Shoemaker v. Whistler, 513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974). Compare Kelley
v. Central Nat'l Bank, 345 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1972) and Mann v. Hender-
son, 314 N.C. 338, 134 S.E.2d 626 (1964) with Colditz v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
529 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209
Tenn. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962).
498 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 615.
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Saurez was apparently disabled when she reached the airport, stat-
ing that under Illinois law a common carrier must bestow on dis-
abled passengers a degree of care "beyond that due to an ordinary
passenger."' The court specifically refrained from addressing the
issues of whether the public wheelchair itself was a common car-
rier, or whether providing the wheelchair itself gave rise to the
duty to exercise extraordinary care for the passenger.8 The answer
to these questions are not necessary, however, since the fact of the
wheelchair's presence should convey knowledge to the common
carrier of the passenger's "disabled" condition, thus giving rise to
the carrier's duty to exercise extraordinary care.
In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. United States,' the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed a decision which held a pilot training
school responsible for the negligence of a student pilot." The dis-
trict court, applying Indiana law, held that the defendant company
which rented an aircraft and provided both ground and flight
instructions, was engaged in a joint enterprise with the student
pilot, and was therefore responsible for the pilot's negligence. The
court set forth the essential elements of a joint enterprise as:
(1) A community of interest in the object and purpose of the un-
dertaking; (2) an equal right to direct and govern the conduct of
the other participant in respect thereto; and (3) a contract, either
express or implied to that effect."
The Allegheny Airlines" decision is to be contrasted with a de-
cision of the Texas Supreme Court in Shoemaker v. Whistler,"
wherein the Texas Supreme Court limited the responsibility for
tort liability under the joint enterprise theory to a joint enterprise
having a "business or pecuniary purpose.""' In doing so, the Texas
l1d. at 616. Applying Illinois law, the court stated
[W]hen a common carrier knows that a passenger is affected by a
physical or mental disability which increases the hazards of travel,
a degree of attention should be bestowed on his safety beyond that
due to an ordinary passenger in proportion to the liability to injury
from the want of it.
8 Id. at 617.
1504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974).
'Old. at 114.
"Id. at 113.
"504 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1974).
'513 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1974).
'
4 d. at 17.
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Supreme Court overruled several precedents to the contrary,15
adopting in toto Section 491 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts." The Shoemaker court noted that the airplane was engaged
in a voluntary civil air patrol search mission at the time of the
accident, and thus the joint owners of the airplane had no pecu-
niary interest in the common purpose of the search; therefore the
negligence of the pilot owner could not be imputed to the passen-
ger-owner.7
In Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,8 the Seventh Circuit, in a
landmark decision, announced that claims for contribution and
indemnity resulting from midair aviation collisions are to be con-
trolled by the federal common law." The Kohr court articulated a
number of reasons for applying a federal law of contribution and in-
demnity to midair collisions,' and then formulated the new federal
15 Id. The court stated:
While the broader definition of joint enterprise (not requiring a
pecuniary interest) has been previously endorsed by this court,
Leeper, Straffus, Nelson, Bonney, we have determined that the defi-
nition set forth in the RESTATEMENT § 491, Comment C, is better
reasoned and is adopted. By limiting the application of the doctrine
to an enterprise having a business or pecuniary purpose, we will
henceforth be avoiding the imposition of a basically commercial
concept upon relationships not having this characteristic.
16 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 491, Comment C (1965). This section
provides, in pertinent part:
The elements which are essential to a joint enterprise are commonly
stated to be four: (1) an agreement, express or implied, among the
members of the group; (2) a common purpose to be carried out
by the group; (3) a community of pecuniary interest in that pur-
pose, among the members; and (4) an equal right to a voice in
the direction of the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control.
17513 S.W.2d 10, 17 (Tex. 1974).
18 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974).
'
9 Id. at 403.
29Id. at 403-04. The court stated:
The basis for imposing a federal law of contribution and indemnity
is what we perceive to be the predominant, indeed almost exclusive,
interest of the federal government in regulating the affairs of the
nation's airways. Moreover, the imposition of a federal rule of
contribution and indemnity serves a second purpose of eliminating
inconsistency of result in similar collision occurrences as well as
within the same occurrence due to the application of differing state
laws on contribution and indemnity. Given the prevailing federal
interest in uniform air law regulation, we deem it desirable that
a federal rule of contribution and indemnity be applied. . . . To
that end, it has been recognized that the principal purpose of the
Act (Federal Aviation Act) is to create one unified system of flight
rules and to centralize in the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
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common law of contribution and indemnity.21 The Kohr decision is
obviously of substantial interest to the aviation industry since the
decision could provide some uniformity to aviation suits, at least
in the federal courts. On the other hand, any significant expansion
of the federal common law to other substantive issues could cause
litigants to "forum shop."
In Cronin v. Delta Airlines, Inc.," the Illinois Appellate Court
held that an air carrier had a duty to exercise ordinary care in the
maintenance of the portions of the terminal that passengers can
reasonably be expected to utilize.' In Cronin, the plaintiff, after
deboarding, was injured as a result of a fall on an escalator leading
to Delta's baggage claim area. The trial court held, as a matter of
law, that the carrier owed the passenger no duty to maintain this
Administration the power to promulgate rules for the safe and effi-
cient use of the country's airspace. (citation omitted) When the
notion of federal preemption over aviation is viewed in combination
with the fact that this litigation ensues from a midair collision
occurring in national airspace, that the Government is a party to
the action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) et seq. (1970)), and that this litigation has since its in-
ception been subject to the supervision of the Judicial Panel cre-
ated by the Multidistrict Litigation Act (28 U.S.C. S 1407 et seq.
(1970)), there is no perceptible reason why federal law should not
be applied to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties in-
volved. The interest of the state wherein the fortuitous event of the
collision occurred is slight as compared to the dominant federal
interest. Accordingly, the rights and liabilities of Allegheny and the
United States are peculiarly federal in nature and are to be governed
by a federal rule of contribution and indemnity.
21 Id. at 405. The court stated:
Having determined that a federal rule of contribution and indemnity
among joint tort-feasors should control in aviation collisions, we
reject as being outmoded and entirely unsatisfactory, the conten-
tion that the federal rule should be one of "no contribution." We
agree that "[t]here is an obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule
which permits the entire burden of a loss, for which two defendants
were equally, unintentionally responsible, to be shouldered on to one
alone, according to the accident of a successful levy of execution,
the existence of liability insurance, the plaintiffs' whim or spite, or
his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes scot
free." (citation omitted)
In our judgment the better rule is that of contribution and in-
demnity on a comparative negligence basis. Under such an approach
the trier of fact will determine on a percentage basis the degree of
negligent involvement of each party in the collision. The loss will
then be distributed in proportion to the allocable occurring fault.
22 19 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 313 N.E.2d 245 (1974).
2 3 1d. at __, 313 N.E.2d at 248.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
area of the terminal. On appeal, the appellate court reversed, fol-
lowing a significant line of decisions indicating that the air carrier's
duty to care for the passengers extends to areas in the terminal
facilities leased to it and reasonably utilized by the passengers. "
In Goldhirsch v. Air France,' a New York City civil court,
following a trilogy of the federal district court cases, held that an
air carrier is not required to give "actual notice" of its reconfirma-
tion requirements since such requirements are contained in a tariff
regulation and passengers are charged as a matter of law with con-
structive notice of the carrier's filed tariffs.' The Goldhirsch deci-
sion is representative of the 1974 decisions applying the limitations
contained in the Warsaw convention and airline tariff agreements."7
The courts have consistently afforded airlines the benefits of these
limitations, despite repeated attacks on their validity.'
Guest Statutes
The 1974 decisions continue the trend established in 1973 of
holding airplane guest statutes unconstitutional. Such statutes were
held unconstitutional in Messmer v. Ker,2' and Ayer v. Boyle.' On
the other hand, there is a decisive split in the courts on the consti-
tutionality of automobile guest statutes. Automobile guest statutes
were held unconstitutional in Kansas,"' Idaho," and North Da-
Aid. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 247-48.
25 3 Av. L. REP. 17,307 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Sept. 27, 1974).
21 Id. at 17,308. The court stated:
Actual notice is not essential with respect to matters required or
authorized to be included in a tariff or tariff regulation and passen-
gers are as a matter of law charged with constructive notice of such
tariffs as filed pursuant to law.
"Ludecke v. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ltd., 3 Av. L. REP. 17,454 (Ct. App.
Montreal, Quebec Dec. 23, 1974); Canadian Pac. Air Lines, Ld. v. Montreal
Trust Co., 3 Av. L. REP. 17,456 (Ct. App. Montreal, Quebec Dec. 23, 1974);
Butler's Shoe Corp. v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 3 Av. L. REP. 17,182
(N.D. Ga. June 5, 1974).
" See, e.g., Brentwood Fabrics Corp. v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 3 Av.
L. REP. 17,426 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. June 26, 1970) and cases cited in note 27
supra.
'96 Idaho 75, 524 P.2d 536 (1974).
3037 Cal. App. 3d 822, 112 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1974).
3 1 Henry v. Bauder, 213 Kan. 751, 518 P.2d 362 (1974).
"'Thompson v. Hagan, 96 Idaho 19, 523 P.2d 1365 (1974).
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kota,"3 whereas, such statutes were held constitutional in Oregon, "
Colorado,' Delaware,' Illinois," Iowa,"8 and Nebraska.'
Res Ipsa Loquitur
Among the legal problems to which the growth of aviation has
given rise is the application in aviation accidents of the doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur ("the thing speaks for itself"). The doctrine of
res ipsa loquitur, as applied in negligence actions generally, has
been variously defined, and there is some difference of opinion as
to its application and effect. The doctrine may be stated very gen-
erally to be that when an injury is caused by an instrumentality
under the exclusive control or management of the defendant and
the occurrence does not ordinarily happen in the absence of neg-
ligence, an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant may
be drawn from the occurrence itself, without proof of any specific
negligent act or omission which will support a finding in favor of
the plaintiff in the absence of evidence to explain the occurrence
on any other reasonable hypothesis.
The appropriateness of the doctrine of res ispa loquitur to air-
craft crash cases split the courts in the past.' For example, in 1964
the North Carolina Supreme Court' stated:
In a case involving an airplane crash the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-
tur does not apply, it being common knowledge that aeroplanes do
fall without fault of the pilot.'
The Tennessee Supreme Court took the opposite view in 1962,
holding that the doctrine was applicable to airplane crashes."
"3 Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D. 1974).
84Duerst v. Limbocker, 525 P.2d 99 (Ore. 1974).
"Richardson v. Hansen, 527 P.2d 536 (Colo. 1974).
' Justice v. Gatchell, 325 A.2d 97 (Del. 1974).
" Adams v. Continental Cas. Co., 21 fI1. App. 3d 111, 314 N.E.2d 495 (1974).
" Keasling v. Thompson, 217 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa 1974).
"Hale v. Taylor, 192 Neb. 298, 220 N.W.2d 378 (1974).
40 Compare Kelley v. Central Nat'l Bank, 345 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Va. 1972)
and Mann v. Henderson, 261 N.C. 338, 134 S.E.2d 626 (1964) with Colditz v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) and Southeastern Avi-
ation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. App. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436 (1962).
"Mann v. Henderson, 261 N.C. 338, 134 S.E.2d 626 (1964).
2Id. at -, 134 S.E.2d at 629.
a3 Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. App. 639, 355 S.W.2d 436
(1962).
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This split in authority continues in the 1974 decisions." In
Newing v. Cheatham,' the California Court of Appeals, Fourth
District, held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applicable
to a pilot's responsibility in an aircraft crash." The court set forth
the elements of a res ipsa case as follows:
(1) The accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not
occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff."'
Analyzing the first element, the trial court took judicial notice
of the state of air travel in this country, and concluded that air
travel is among the safest forms of travel, and that accidents seldom
occur in the absence of negligent or careless conduct of some type
on the part of the owner and/or operator of the aircraft, or those
who have control over it."' The court did not address the question
of what proof must be offered to satisfy the second element;
rather the court simply stated that the jury should be instructed as
follows:
[T]he trial judge should have instructed the jury if it found from
the expert testimony, common knowledge and all the circumstances
shown by the evidence that the accident was more probably than
not the result of the pilot's negligence, it could infer negligence
from the happening of the accident alone.49
Thus the courts have not only approved the application of the
doctrine of res ipsa to aircraft crashes, but also approved a res
ipsa instruction to the jury.*
"Compare Newing v. Cheatam, 42 Cal. App. 3d 565, 117 Cal. Rptr. 30
(1974) with Campbell v. First Nat'l Bank, 370 F. Supp. 1096 (D. N. Mex. 1974).
"42 Cal. App. 3d 565, 117 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1974).
48Id. at 572, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
4 1Id. at 571, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
"Id. at 571, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
Id. at 572, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
"The Texas Supreme Court in Mobile Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245
(Tex. 1974) approved the following instruction in res ipsa cases:
Among the definitions in the forepart of the charge, the trial court
may include an explanation of res ipsa loquitur similar to the
following:
"You are instructed that you may infer negligence by a party but
are not compelled to do so, if you find that the character of the
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The Newing decision is to be contrasted with Campbell v. First
Nat'l Bank of Albuquerque,' in which the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico, applying New Mexico law,
held that the doctrine of res ipsa was not applicable to the pilot's
negligence. The court gave special attention to the requirement
in a res ipsa case that the plaintiff prove that his injury was "proxi-
mately caused by an agency or instrumentality under the exclusive
control of the defendant" (emphasis added)." The court refused
to apply the doctrine because the plaintiff did not sufficiently dem-
onstrate that the pilot had control over the aircraft, in its "mechani-
cal and operational aspects," in order to invoke the doctrine. The
court stated that the fact that federal regulations make the pilot
"directly responsible for.., the operation of the aircraft" did not
compel the conclusion that the defendant had "exclusive control"
of the instrumentality." The Campbell court reserved decision on
the question of whether, because approximately eighty-three percent
of all general aviation accidents are attributable to "pilot error," an
airline accident is of the "kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence of someone," so as to satisfy the first re-
quirement of res ipsa.'
Although the Campbell court avoided decision on the ultimate
question of whether the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be
applied to the responsibility of a pilot in an aircraft crash, the
implication of the decision is that the doctrine should not be
applied. This would appear to be the appropriate resolution since
airline crashes can also be attributed to a number of causes other
accident is such that it would ordinarily not happen in the absence
of negligence and if you find that the instrumentality causing the
accident was under the management and control of the party at
the time the negligence, if any, causing the accident probably
occurred."
517 S.W.2d at 257.
31370 F. Supp. 1096 (D. N. Mex. 1974).
'Id. at 1098.
53 id. at 1099.
"Id. at 1098. The court stated:
We do not question the plaintiff's assertion that under the applicable
federal regulations Birdseye, as "pilot in command," was "directly
responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of the
aircraft." 14 C.F.R. S 91.3(a) (1973). This does not, however, com-
pel the conclusion that the aircraft was under his exclusive control.
65ld. at 1098-99.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
than pilot error, for example, a defect in either the design or manu-
facture of the aircraft, or negligence on the part of any number of
other individuals associated with the flight of the aircraft. More-
over, one of the predominant purposes of res ipsa is to place the
burden of proof on the one who is in the best position to explain
the accident-the defendant. If the pilot perished in the crash he is
obviously not available to explain anything. Thus, at least in the
instances where the pilot's lips are sealed by death, the initial
justification for invoking the res ipsa doctrine is not present. Under
such circumstances, it would appear that the doctrine should not
be applied.
Negligence
In Pilgrim Aviation and Airlines, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines,
Inc.," the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, applying Connecticut law, held that a pilot's violation
of Federal Aviation Regulations is negligence per se if the pilot
acted unreasonably. In determining whether the pilot acted unrea-
sonably, the court instructed the jury that the pilot was to be judged
under the standards of a "reasonably prudent airline pilot." This
injection of the "reasonable man" standard to the negligence per se
doctrine is apparently unique to Connecticut law. In any event, the
real significance of Pilgrim lies in its language concerning Section
91.29 of the Federal Aviation Regulations, which places the re-
sponsibility for determining the airworthiness of an aircraft for
safe flight on the pilot. The court states that the fact that violation
of this regulation can serve as a basis for a finding of negligence
per se "is not open to question."''
Insurance Coverage
A number of recent decisions concerning insurance coverage
reveal that the courts are continuing to act on the general propo-
sition that exclusion clauses are to be strictly construed against the
insurer.
In Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna,"' the Second
Circuit held that damages caused to the plaintiff's aircraft by mem-
bers of the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
-M 3 Av. L. REP. 17,458 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
"I Id. at 17,460.
TM 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
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were covered under the all-risk policy." The facts indicated that
the Pan American flight, while on a regularly scheduled flight from
Brussels to New York, was hijacked over London about 45 minutes
after it had taken off from an intermediate stop in Amsterdam.
Two men acting for the PFLP forced the crew of the aircraft to
fly to Beirut, where a demolitions expert and explosives were put
on board. The aircraft was then flown to Egypt, still under the
control of the two men from the PFLP. After the passengers were
evacuated the aircraft was totally destroyed. The insurance com-
pany denied coverage under several exclusions to its all-risk policy."
In an exhaustive opinion, the court applied the doctrine of contra
proferentem, i.e. that in order for the insurance company to benefit
from an exclusion it must demonstrate that an interpretation favor-
ing it is the only reasonable reading of at least one relevant exclu-
sion; it is not sufficient to show a reasonable interpretation under
which the loss is excluded."' The court gave detailed attention to
the meaning of each exclusion clause, and concluded that none of
the exclusions were applicable to the specific facts of the instant
case." The court felt that hijacking was a known risk at the time
the policy was written, and that the insurance company could have
59 Id. at 1022.
60 id. at 1005. The court stated:
The all-risk insurers rely on all of the following words of exclusion
in the all risk policies:
"This policy does not cover anything herein to the contrary not-
withstanding loss or damage due to or resulting from:
1. capture, seizure . . . or any taking of the property insured
or damage to or destruction thereof . . . by any military . . . or
usurped power, whether any of the foregoing be done by way of
requisition or otherwise and whether in time of peace or war and
whether lawful or unlawful. .... ;
2. war, . . . civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection or
warlike operations, whether there be a declaration of war or not;
3. . . . riots, civil commotion."
The all-risk position is that the terms employed define uninterrupted,
overlapping areas of exclusion on a continuum of violence. They
claim that in terms of approximately increasing scale and organiza-
tion of violence, "riot," "civil commotion," "insurrection," "military
or usurped power," "rebellion," "revolution," "civil war," "warlike
operations," and "war" exhaust the possibilities, and that the cause
of the loss must be described by at least one of the terms.
61d. at 999-1000.
02 Id. at 1005-22.
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excluded hijacking by denominating "hijacking" as one of the
specific exclusions under the policy."
In Woods v. Insurance Company of N. America,' a California
court of appeals held that the fact that the pilot's medical certifi-
cate had expired did not affect coverage under the policy provision
which required a pilot to be "properly certified and rated for the
flight of aircraft."" The court implied that if the insurance com-
pany felt that the medical certificate was relevant it could place a
specific exclusion into the policy for pilots who are not covered by
a current medical certificate."
In Southwest Life Ins. Co. v. Rowsey,"' a Texas court of civil
appeals applied unusual logic in affirming coverage for injuries
caused in the crash of an "experimental" aircraft. The policy denied
coverage for death in an aircraft crash unless "death occurred as a
result of travel... exclusively as a passenger ... in a duly registered
and certified passenger aircraft being legally operated ... "' The
defendant insurance company argued (1) that the aircraft was not
a "certified passenger aircraft" and (2) that the aircraft was not
being "legally operated." The insurance company argued that since
the airworthiness certificate provided that no person could be car-
ried in the aircraft during flight unless "that person is essential to
the purpose of the flight," the aircraft could not be a "passenger"
aircraft. The court avoided this contention, reasoning that since
the terms "registered and certified passenger aircraft" were not de-
fined in the policy and the FAA did not have classifications for
"passenger aircraft," this limitation should not be afforded any
significance. The court stated that since the experimental aircraft
in question was capable of carrying passengers, it was a "passenger
aircraft." The defendant argued that since plaintiff claimed he was
riding "exclusively as a passenger," the aircraft was being operated
in violation of the provision in the airworthiness certificate requir-
ing that only "persons essential to the flight" be on board; thus
the aircraft was being "unlawfully operated." The court rejected
"Id.
"38 Cal. App. 3d 144, 113 Cal. Rptr. 82 (1974).
Id. at 147, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 84.
"Id. See also Insurance Co. of N. America v. Maurer, 505 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.
Civ. App. Austin 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
67514 S.W.2d 802 (Tex. Civ. App. Austin 1974, no writ).
8 ld. at 804.
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this contention, holding that the operation of the plane in violation
of the airworthiness certificate does not mean that the plane is being
"unlawfully operated."69 The court noted that the insurance com-
pany could have excluded operation of the aircraft in violation of
an airworthiness certificate, but did not do so, and therefore could
not complain."'
The Aetna, Woods, and Rowsey trilogy of decisions indicate that
the courts are ostensibly looking to what the insurance company
could have excluded, and giving this finding substantial weight in
determining whether or not a given situation is excluded under the
general terms of the policy.
On the other hand, in Braun v. Ins. Co. of N. America,"' the
Fifth Circuit construed the word "affiliate" in a policy exclusion to
include a "parent corporation." The court stated that the use of the
word "affiliate" in the exclusion was meant to include any of the
separate corporate entities within the corporate structure, whether
vertical, diagonal, or horizontal." And, in Gustafson v. National
Insurance Underwriters,' a Texas court of civil appeals held that a
person who had been riding in an airplane, and, after landing on
the ground, jumped from the wing of the aircraft and raised her
hand which was struck by the whirling blades of the propeller,
was "alighting" from the aircraft, and therefore, was a passenger
within the meaning of the terms of the policy which excluded cover-
age for actions by passengers.'
In Melton v. Ranger Ins. Co.,' the defendant Ranger insured
Van under an aviation policy. Van leased a plane to Melton which
was involved in an accident and Ranger denied coverage. Plaintiff
alleged that the policy was ambiguous in that it was stated in the
"Purpose of Use" that insured planes would be used for rentals,
although there was a specific provision that the policy did not
cover persons renting the aircraft. The Texas court of civil appeals
held that the implication of the "Purpose of Use" would not over-
69 Id. at 806.
701d.
71488 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1974).
72 Id. at 1067-68.
" 517 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. Eastland 1974).
"
4 Id. at 416-17.
71515 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Civ. App. Fort Worth 1974).
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ride the express provision and that the policy did not cover the
renter of the plane."8
Air Traffic Controllers
In Todd v. United States," the United States District Court for
the Middle District of Florida held that an air traffic controller has
a duty to issue altitude clearances over and beyond the duty to
issue clearances in accordance with FAA manuals, when such
clearances are "reasonably designed to insure the safety of aircraft
flight.""8 In doing so, the court added a fifth element to the stan-
dards of duty imposed upon the pilot and air traffic controller under
the prior decision of the Fifth Circuit in American Airlines, Inc. v.
United States."' The Todd court stated:
In a very thorough consideration of the standards of duty imposed
upon the pilot and ATC the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in American Airlines, Inc. v. United States [11
Avi. 17,156] 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969) set forth the following:
1. The pilot is in command of the aircraft, is directly responsible
for its operation, and has final authority as to its operation.
2. Before a pilot can be held legally responsible for the movement
of his aircraft he must know, or be held to have known, these facts
which were then material to its safe operation. Certainly the pilot
is charged with that knowledge which in the exercise of the highest
degree of care he should have known.
3. The air traffic controller must give the warnings specified by the
manuals.
4. The air traffic controller, whether or not required by the man-
uals, must warn of dangers reasonably apparent to him but not ap-
parent, in the exercise of due care, to the pilot. 418 F.2d at 193.
To these the court would add a fifth requirement appropriate to
the issues of this case:
5. Determined by the facts of the particular case, due care re-
quires an air traffic controller to issue clearances in accordance
with the FAA manuals, and over and beyond the requirements
of the manuals, the clearances issued must be reasonably designed
to insure the safety of aircraft flight."M
In addition to Todd v. United States," two other decisions are
76 Id. at 374.
7384 F. Supp. 1284 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
71Id. at 1291.
7"418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
80384 F. Supp. 1284, 1291 (M.D. Fla. 1974).
81 Id. at 1291.
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of significant interest based on their factual distinctions. In Robin-
son v. United States,8 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas held that the air traffic controller did
not have a duty to warn of wake turbulence that occurred five
minutes before the accident. This finding was based upon the gen-
eral rule that air traffic controllers have a duty to warn of wake
turbulence only if it is reasonably foreseeable. In contrast, in
Dickens v. United States,' the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas held that the air traffic controller, under
the circumstances of that case (a three-minute lapse), was under
a duty to give a wake turbulence warning.
Wrongful Death-Admiralty
In Roberts v. United States,8" the Ninth Circuit held that the
Suits in Admiralty Act (SIA), as amended, encompasses aviation
wrongful death actions against the United States arising under the
general maritime law or under the Death on The High Seas Act."
The court recognized that the Supreme Court of the United States
in Executive Jete' had expressly reserved decision on the question
presented." The court analyzed the facts presented in light of
Executive Jet, and concluded that Executive Jet could be distin-
guished since the aircraft in the instant case was engaged in "trans-
oceanic transportation of cargo" which was readily analogized with
"traditional maritime activity.""' In this regard, the court stated:
82 3 Av. L. REp. 5 17,333 (N.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd per curiam, 475 F.2d 1403
(5th Cir. 1973).
"378 F. Supp. 845 (S.D. Tex. 1974).
84498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1070 (1974).
5 d. at 526.
" Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972).
"'Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1974). The court
quoted from Executive Jet as follows:
We need not decide today whether an aviation tort can ever, under
any circumstances, bear a sufficient relationship to traditional mari-
time activity to come within admiralty jurisdiction in the absence of
legislation. It could be argued, for instance, that if a plane flying
from New York to London crashed in the mid-Atlantic, there would
be admiralty jurisdiction over resulting tort claims even absent a
specific statute. An aircraft in that situation might be thought to
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity be-
cause it would be performing a function traditionally performed by
water-borne vessels.
88 Id. at 524.
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An examination of the record provides several bases for distin-
guishing the air accident in this case from the crash which occur-
red in Executive Jet. According to appellee's amended complaint,
the Flying Tiger Lines aircraft was engaged in transporting cargo
between Los Angeles and Viet Nam; Okinawa was merely one of a
number of intermediate stopping points. Geographic realities,
therefore, do not make the cargo plane's contact with navigable
waters entirely "fortuitous." More significantly, the trans-oceanic
transportation of cargo is an activity which is readily analogized
with "traditional maritime activity. .. ." Indeed, before the advent
of aviation, such shipping could only be performed by waterborne
vessels. We therefore do not interpret Executive Jet, supra, as pre-
cluding a maritime action on the facts of this case."
Hijacking
In Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,' a New York court of
appeals was faced with a claim for mental distress suffered in an
airline hijacking situation. The court looked to Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention and noted that recoveries were allowed for
"bodily injuries" only. The court stated that the term "bodily injury"
connotes palpable, conspicuous, physical injury and excludes men-
tal injury with no observable "bodily," as distinguished from "be-
havioral" manifestations.
In Edwards v. National Airlines, Inc.,91 the court held that an
air carrier could be responsible for injuries plaintiff suffered by
eating contaminated food in Cuba. The plaintiff alleged the airline
was negligent in allowing the aircraft to be hijacked, and as a result
of that negligence plaintiff was forced to reside in quarters fur-
nished by the Cuban government, and, in order to sustain herself,
to eat "dangerous and illness-causing" foods. The court held that
this complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action, and that
the damages were not so remote as to render the complaint vulner-
able to a motion to dismiss.'
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Globe Indemnity Co.,' the Minne-
sota Supreme Court held that the air carrier could recover the
ransom paid to recover a hijacked aircraft, under the carriers
89 Id.
9'34 N.Y.2d 385, 314 N.E.2d 848, 358 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1974).
"307 So.2d 244 (Fla. App. 1974).
"Id. at 245-46.
"225 N.W.2d 831 (Minn. 1975).
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"blanket crime policy."" The court held this was a "wrongful ab-
straction" within the meaning of the policy."' In Pan American
World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna" (discussed in detail in the insurance
section), the Second Circuit upheld coverage under an "all-risk"
policy for the destruction of plaintiff's aircraft by hijackers. Both
courts recognized the insurance company's right to exclude dam-
ages caused by "hijacking," but stated that such an exclusion would
have to be specific.
Manufacturer's Liability
In Williams v. Cessna Aircraft Corp.,"7 the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Mississippi, applying
Mississippi law, held that a manufacturer was under no duty to
design its seat and harness assembly to withstand a high speed
crash. The court applied the Mississippi substantive law commonly
known as the "second accident" doctrine in determining that the
manufacturer of the defective seat and harness assembly was not
responsible," since the "initial accident" was the crash of the air-
craft rather than the failure of the seat and harness.
The Williams decision is contrary to several other recent products
liability cases which hold that if a manufacturer of a product should
be able to reasonably foresee that the product would be involved
in some sort of crash, the manufacturer has a duty to make the
product reasonably safe. For example, the courts are beginning to
recognize this "crashworthiness" concept in automobile accident
cases, and are placing a duty on manufacturers to make cars rea-
sonably safe for the occupant's use in the event the automobile is
involved in a crash."
41d. at 837.
Id. at 835.
505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
"376 F. Supp. 603 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
"Id. at 607. The court stated:
Mississippi law precludes imposition of liability on the basis of a
"second accident" where the alleged defect did not cause or con-
tribute to the initial mishap and did not arise from the intended
normal use for which the product was manufactured.
"Perez v. Ford Motor Co., 497 F.2d 82 (5th Cir. 1974); Turcotte v. Ford
Motor Co., 494 F.2d 173 (1st Cir. 1974).
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Noise-Inverse Condemnation
In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,' the California court of ap-
peals held that the municipal operator of an airport is liable for a
taking or damaging of property when the following elements are
satisfied: (1) the owner of property in the vicinity of the airport
can show a measurable reduction in market value of his property;
(2) the reduction results from the operation of the airport in a
manner that the noise from aircraft causes a substantial interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of the property; and (3) the
interference is sufficiently direct and sufficiently peculiar that the
owner, if uncompensated, would pay more than his proper share
to the public undertaking. Whether the interference is "substantial"
is a mixed question of fact and law for the trial judge to deter-
mine.' The Aaron court rejected the theory that the aircraft must
actually violate the airspace above the plaintiff's land before re-
sponsibility arises." '
In a companion case, 1 the court held that the air carriers
operating at the municipal airport which was involved in Aaron v.
City of Los Angeles would not be liable to the adjacent property
owners in an inverse condemnation action, since only governmental
agencies can take property.'" Further, the court refused to hold
the air carriers responsible to the municipality even though the
carriers had agreed to indemnify the municipality since the munici-
pality was not responsible under traditional tort liability.1"
In Pueblo of Sandia v. Smith,0' the Tenth Circuit affirmed a
summary judgment for defendants, stating that a landowner can-
not recover unless he alleges and proves that low-level flights "are
in the immediate reaches of, and interfere with the actual use of,
his land.' '.. The mere traversing of airspace above a plaintiff's
land, without injury, is not actionable.
10040 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974).
"1 Id. at 493, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 177.
"'Id. at 484, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
103 City of Los Angeles v. Japan Airlines Co., 41 Cal. App. 3d 416, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1974).
104 Id. at 426-27, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 76-77.
10'Id. at 428, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 77-78.
104497 F.2d 1043 (10th Cir. 1974).
o10 Id. at 1045.
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II. AMENDMENTS AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO
REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
Introduction
During 1974, a number of new laws, amendments, and pro-
posals were announced which should be of some general interest
to the aviation bar. Some of these amendments and proposed
amendments are discussed herein for the general benefit of the
symposium. This discussion is not intended, however, to exhaust
all 1974 amnedments which relate to aviation law.
Transportation Safety Act
The President signed Public Law 93-633 on January 3, 1975,
entitled the "Transportation Safety Act of 1974."
Title I of this enactment is titled the Hazardous Materials Trans-
portation Act"' and is designed to improve the regulatory and en-
forcement authority of the Secretary of Transportation in order to
protect the nation adequately against the risks to life and property
which are inherent in the transportation of hazardous materials in
commerce. Among its provisions, it requires the Secretary to issue
regulations regarding the transportation of radioactive materials
on any passenger-carrying aircraft. These regulations are required
to prohibit any such transportation unless the radioactive materials
involved are intended for use in, or incident to, research, or medical
diagnosis or treatment, and are packaged in such a way that they
do not pose an unreasonable hazard to health and safety. In addi-
tion, Title I amends Sections 901 (a) and 902(h) of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, and Sections 6(c) and 6(f) of the Depart-
ment of Transportation Act to conform the provisions of these
sections to the new act.' °
Noise Standards
The Federal Aviation Administration has amended Parts 21 and
36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to prescribe noise standards
for the issuance of normal, utility, acrobatic, transport, and re-
stricted category type certificates for propeller driven small air-
craft, to prescribe noise standards for the issuance of standard air-
worthiness certificates and restricted category airworthiness certifi-
10849 U.S.C. S 1801 et seq. (1975).
11 1 Av. L. REP'. 55 1452, 2909, 2911 (1975).
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cates for newly produced propeller driven small aircraft of older
type designs, and to prohibit "acoustical changes" in the type de-
sign of those aircraft that increase their noise levels beyond speci-
fied limits." '
Multidistrict Litigation Rules of Procedure
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has issued an ex-
tensive revision of its rules of procedure. The new rules are to be
effective on February 14, 1975. Among the changes, the Panel has
added specific rules regarding matters submitted to the Panel on
briefs on the effect of the pendency of an action before the Panel.1 '
Proposals
First Biennial Airworthiness Review
The First Biennial Airworthiness Review conference was held
in Washington, D.C. on December 2 through December 11, 1974.
A number of significant proposals concerning federal aviation
regulations were submitted for review. These proposals mirror the
dedication of the aviation industry toward improving the overall
safety of air transportation. Representatives from more than 20
nations registered for the conference, along with a number of U.S.
government agencies, trade organizations, and individual com-
panies comprising the national and international aviation commu-
nity. With the inception of the Biennial Review Conferences, the
Federal Aviation Administration can now conduct a comprehen-
sive, across-the-board, substantive review of its airworthiness regu-
lations.
Proposals were made to establish stall and minimum steady
flight speeds where none currently exist,"" to require an adequate
stall warning in terms of a speed and/or a time margin when entry
to stall is made from yaw flight or from an accelerated entry,"' to
include a new rule standardizing alarms," ' to require a takeoff
warning system to alert the crew when wing flaps, spoilers, leading
edge devices, elevator/stabilizer trim and any other critical devices
"140 Fed. Reg. 1061 (1975); 1A Av. L. REP. 55 4202, 4559A (1975).
"28 U.S.C. S 1407 (1970).
"'Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 23.49.
"' Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 23.207.
"' Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 25.
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are not in a position to assure a successful takeoff,"' to add a new
section requiring a takeoff warning horn which will indicate a flap
setting error within preset tolerances,"' to add a regulation re-
quiring a comprehensive standardized warning system, where none
currently exists,'17 to provide for additional fire detector systems,"8
to require a low fuel warning system to give an oral or visual warn-
ing to the pilot when fuel reaches an amount equal to that which
would give 20 minutes flight,"' to update the requirements for
issuance of type certification,"' to establish uniform continued air-
worthiness instruction standards for all classes of aircraft,"' and
to require anti-collision warning lights."'
Noise Standards
The Federal Aviation Administration is considering amending
Parts 21 and 36 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to reflect pro-
posed regulations submitted to it by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) regarding noise standards for propellor driven small
aircraft."' The EPA proposals would prescribe noise standards for
the issuance of normal, utility, acrobatic, transport, and restricted
category type certificates for propeller driven small aircraft, pre-
scribe noise standards for the issuance of standard airworthiness
certificates and restricted category airworthiness certificates for
newly produced propeller driven small aircraft of older type de-
signs, and prohibit "acoustical changes" in the type design of those
aircraft that increase their noise levels beyond specified limits.' "
The Federal Aviation Administration is also considering amend-
ing Part 91 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to reflect an EPA
proposal regarding noise abatement minimum altitudes for turbo-
jet powered aircraft in terminal areas. Specifically, the EPA pro-
posals would add a regulatory definition of the term "terminal
"I Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 25.659.
"'Proposed Amendmen to F.A.R. 25.1307(i).
"' Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 25.1322.
"' Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 23.1203.
"'9 Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 29.1305(a).
20 Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 21.51.
121Proposed Amendment to F.A.R. 25.1529(a).
"22 Proposed Amendments to F.A.R. 29.1401, 29.1401(b), and 29.1401(f).
"21 1 Av. L. REP. 5 3869 (1975).
124 Id.
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area" to Part 91 and would prescribe minimum altitudes for turbo-
jet powered aircraft within terminal areas.1"
Smoke Standards
The Federal Aviation Administration is considering amending
Parts 25 and 121 of the Federal Aviation Regulations to establish
standards for the smoke emission characteristics of compartment
interior materials used in transport category aircraft."'
12 5 Id.
12' 593 CCH Aviation Law Reports 4 (Feb. 17, 1975).
